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Responsible International Citizenship and China’s 
Participation in Arctic Regionalization 
 
 
Liisa Kauppila & Sanna Kopra 
 
 
This paper analyses the normative underpinnings of China’s participation in processes of Arctic regionalization. Building on 
Gareth Evans’ concept of responsible international citizenship, it argues that China’s Arctic engagement is chiefly motivated  
by the government’s efforts to promote the wellbeing of Chinese citizens – a state of affairs that the current regime equals with 
the ideal of social stability. As a responsible international citizen, China should, however, advance this “enlightened self -
interest” vis-á-vis other members of the Arctic international society, that is, either internalize the established practices that 
organize the Arctic region or mold them in peaceful ways. In the empirical parts of the paper, we first identify three concre te 
aims that drive forward China’s participation in Arctic regionalization – creating wealth through more “green” growth, 
mitigating the effects of climate change on China, and promoting a unifying ideology. We then suggest that China has not directly 
violated any of the key organizing principles of the Arctic international society, but it has found distinct ways to act out these 
concrete goals and advance the wellbeing of its citizens. Such means include somewhat challenging the dominant interpretation 
of these norms and refraining from advocating stricter environmental standards. 
  
Introduction 
In line with its rising global power, China has become increasingly interested in partaking in 
economic, social, and political processes that constitute the Arctic region within and outside the 
Arctic Council (AC), the principal regional intergovernmental forum. Unsurprisingly, an extensive 
literature examining China’s Arctic interests has emerged (e.g. Kobzeva, 2019; Koivurova & Kopra, 
2020; Su & Huntington, 2021). Yet, an ideational basis for China’s Arctic activities has not been 
elaborated. In this paper, we seek to fulfill this gap by analyzing the normative underpinnings of 
China’s participation in processes of regionalization. Since the existing literature indicates that 
China’s rise will alter the future of regions globally (Kavalski, 2009; cf. Dent, 2016; Zhang, 2005), 
this knowledge is also relevant to broader audiences. 
Theoretically, we contribute to constructivist work on regionalism by studying the roles of interests, 
values and other ideational aspects of social life in processes of regionalization; this is an approach 
that has gained a prominent place in theories of regionalism in recent years (Söderbaum, 2016: 45–
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48). We define the Arctic as a socially constructed region that is being made and unmade by various 
“regionalizing actors” (Söderbaum, 2016) within and outside the traditional geopolitical boundaries 
of the region. We view these processes as working through historically contingent intersubjective 
meanings, norms and practices; hence they are inherently normative and shaped by states’ ideas 
and values, including notions of responsibility. 
Based on the assumption that all states seek to define international rights and responsibilities in a 
way that supports the realization of their national needs and greeds, we utilize the concept of 
responsible international citizenship as a lens to study China’s involvement in Arctic 
regionalization. Needless to say, this does not mean that we somehow seek to advocate China’s 
notions of responsibility in the Arctic or elsewhere. Instead, we presume that states’ key 
responsibility is to enable and maintain the wellbeing of their citizens, and their participation in 
processes of regionalization is also therefore guided by this duty. As there is no universal 
understanding of what “wellbeing” means in practice, the ways in which states seek – or can – 
advance their citizens’ wellbeing depends on the context. In this article, we ask: what are the ways 
in which China’s participation in Arctic regionalization seeks to advance the wellbeing of Chinese 
citizens? Obviously, the concept of responsible international citizen does not suggest that states 
can do whatever they want to advance the needs of their citizens but they must reconcile their 
policies with those of others. As responsible international citizenship “involves constructive and 
balanced endeavours” in a regional context (Evans, 1990), we also ask: Does China balance its 
Arctic policies with the existing norms of Arctic regionalization, or does it seek to somewhat 
challenge them? If so, does it do it in a peaceful manner? 
In the following section, we explain our constructivist approach and argue that states’ responsibility 
to facilitate the wellbeing of their citizens is a principal driver of their participation in global 
processes of regionalization. In the empirical sections, we demonstrate that three particular notions 
of wellbeing explain China’s willingness to participate in Arctic regionalization: “green” growth, 
mitigation of climate change related risks in China, and bringing the people together through a 
unifying ideology. Our data include China’s official documents, speeches, state media and journal 
articles written by Chinese scholars. Finally, we conclude that China has not directly violated any 
of the key organizing principles of the Arctic region, but it has found distinct ways to interpret 
them in its urge to advance the wellbeing of its citizens. 
Regionalization and notions of responsibility 
No region exists in a vacuum, and regionalization – processes of social, political and economic 
cooperation, integration and cohesion “by which regions are made and unmade in various fields of 
activity and at various levels” (Söderbaum, 2016: 54) – is never untouched by “outside” 
transformation. Acknowledging this, scholars of New Regionalism have studied the relationship 
between globalization and regionalization, and emphasised that globalization drivers forward 
processes of regionalization and spawns various kinds of regional forms (e.g. Hettne, Inotai & 
Sunkel, 1999; Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998; Söderbaum, 2016). Although regionalization is 
inherently a political process, meaning that it entails discursive struggles over interests, values and 
norms, New Regionalism pays little attention to the normative dynamics of regionalization. This is 
rather unsurprising given that International Relations (IR) theory has not traditionally paid much 
attention to normative aspects of world politics: realists have stated that a state’s responsibility 
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stops at the national border while neorealists and neoliberalists have maintained that states carry 
responsibilities only if it is in their national interests. 
Arguably, an analysis of regionalizing actors’ national interests cannot offer us sufficient 
information of dynamics of processes of regionalization: notions of responsibility matter in the 
creation of regions. It is widely accepted within IR that organizations such as states, corporations 
and institutions are moral agents (e.g. Erskine, 2003). Yet, apart from the draft Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts compiled by the International Law Commission in 2001, 
there is no international agreement on state responsibility. From the constructivist perspective, 
however, this does not matter: responsibilities of states (or any other agent) are not given or static 
but they are socially constructed in time and place. Hence, they are contingent on international 
balance of power, material and ideational changes, unexpected events, etc. While national interests 
undoubtedly shape the social construction of responsibilities, they should not be understood in 
narrow terms of self-interests; rather, we must investigate their deeper ideational and normative 
basis to fully understand a state’s notions of legitimate conduct at home and abroad.  
From a constructivist perspective, the concept of responsible citizenship offers a fruitful lens to 
analyze states’ notions of responsibility. It was coined by Senator Gareth Evans, Australia’s then 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a series of foreign policy speeches in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Evans stated that ethical standards of conduct are essential if states are to practice responsible 
foreign policy. Yet he noted that “good international citizenship is not an idealistic distraction or a 
quixotic quest”, nor “is it the foreign policy equivalent of boy scout good deeds” (Evans, 1990). 
Hence, good international citizenship means “no more – and no less – than the pursuit of 
enlightened self-interest” (ibid.). Evans’ concept emphasizes that responsible states do not have to 
sacrifice their domestic interests (however they are defined) but they must shoulder responsibilities 
to both their own population and international society as a whole. In modern times, thus, 
sovereignty can be defined as the “authority to be a member of the international community” 
(Perrez, 2000: 332), and such authority “inherently includes a duty or responsibility: the duty and 
the obligation to fulfill the tasks of a state, i.e. to enable and maintain wellbeing of its people, and 
to participate as a responsible member in the solution of common problems of the international 
community” (ibid: 335). 
In the Arctic, the Chinese government has not traditionally been considered a regionalizing actor 
because China does not possess sovereignty above the Arctic Circle. Since the end of the Cold 
War, however, the Arctic has globalized in many ways (e.g. Finger & Heininen, 2019), meaning 
that the space and time compression (Harvey, 1989) has altered the social construction of the 
region so radically that it can no longer be defined as a geographic and cultural-historic region 
exclusively projected by the states in the region. Today, many international standards and treaties, 
such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the International 
Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar 
Code), play a role in Arctic governance, while the Arctic Council continues to be the key platform 
for regional dialogue. Clearly, China, which in June 2017 officially added the Polar Silk Road (冰上丝
绸之路) to President Xi Jinping’s flagship project the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and published 
its first-ever Arctic strategy in January 2018 (State Council of the PRC, 2018b; Xinhua, 2017; State 
Council of the PRC, 2021), is not the only external actor that seeks to increase involvement in the 
Arctic. In addition to China, which was accepted as an observer in the AC in 2013, twelve other 
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non-Arctic states and a number of international and non-governmental organizations take part in 
the Council’s work. Their growing regional interest has greatly invigorated globalization and 
informal processes of regionalization in the Arctic, i.e. those activities that take place outside the 
formal institutional structures.  
Pursuit of domestic wellbeing as a driver of China’s participation in Arctic 
regionalization 
By now, it is apparently clear that we do not regard the pursuit for power as a key motivator of 
China’s Arctic engagement. While acknowledging that power struggles cannot be completely 
dismissed in international politics, we suggest that China’s involvement in the Arctic is chiefly 
motivated by the government’s “pursuit of enlightened self-interest” to provide wellbeing for its 
citizens: a task that the current regime equals, to a large extent, with that of maintaining social 
stability – a state of affairs that corresponds with the age-old Confucian ideals and the needs of the 
ruling party (cf. Kallio, 2016). In this section, we identify three concrete means through which the 
Chinese government pursues to advance the wellbeing of Chinese citizens in the Arctic context: 
creating wealth through more “green” growth, mitigating the effects of climate change on China 
and promoting a unifying ideology. Ultimately, all these aspects promote social stability in distinct 
ways that are further elaborated below. 
Before proceeding into the actual analysis, a note should be made on the timespan of China’s Arctic 
visions. Arguably, China’s Arctic strategy is based on the high likelihood that the material 
importance of the region will increase in the future, especially as the last frontier of fossil fuels and 
a scene of alternative shipping routes. For this reason, China’s participation in Arctic 
regionalization illustrates that future-oriented politics are essential if states want to ensure their 
capability to fulfil their national responsibilities in the decades to come. What is more, the Arctic 
case illustrates very well the paradoxical nature of contemporary international politics: states are 
ready to support extremely costly, ambitious, and risky economic projects in far-away places to 
provide material wellbeing at home, although such schemes may compromise the wellbeing of 
others – and even their own people, if the long-term consequences of fossil economy are 
considered. 
Promoting growth and greenifying the Chinese economy 
Since the economic reforms started in 1978, China has transformed from a relatively self-sufficient 
– but poor – economy to a rather open middle-income country that has managed to improve the 
basic living conditions of its citizens by creating employment, eliminating absolute poverty, and 
increasing disposable incomes across the country. Generally, this has contributed to the overall 
satisfaction of the citizens, which is a crucial precondition for social stability and wellbeing. Over 
the past few decades, the Chinese people have, however, become much more aware of the nexus 
between growth, pollution and health problems, which has resulted in a growing dissatisfaction 
(Shapiro, 2012). In a post-totalitarian society, where people are harder to control and order is more 
challenging to force, these concerns are voiced in numerous protests (Albert & Xu, 2016), which 
inevitably carries the risk of shaking social stability. Despite the party-state’s ability to control such 
outbursts much more effectively than democratic societies could or would because of their 
constitutional liberties (e.g. freedom of speech and assembly), the government is compelled to take 
drastic actions to “greenify” the economy. 
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Given this two-fold aim to maintain growth and take steady steps towards a low-carbon future in 
China, it is clear that the state continues to be dependent on overseas resources and partnerships 
in promoting wellbeing. In practice, the government seeks to make use of imported natural 
resources and technology transfer in lifting China to the status of an advanced high-income 
economy that no longer heavily relies on the manufacturing sector but gradually catches up with 
the West technologically and develops into a “knowledge power” (cf. Mayer, 2012). The overall 
development of China’s science sector is also in a crucial role in this task: science is the key to both 
enhancing productivity and mitigating emissions of economic activities. All together, these aims 
constitute the primary rationale for China’s global outreach and the current strategy through which 
it is executed: President Xi’s BRI (cf. Kauppila, 2022).  
Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that the Chinese government advances its idea of the Polar 
Silk Road, and thus takes increasingly part in economic processes that seek to utilize Arctic natural 
resources – and which greatly contribute to the social construction of the Arctic region itself. In 
addition to the exploration and extraction of natural gas and oil – fossil fuels that are hard to replace 
with renewables in some critical functions of Chinese society (e.g. air travel) – the government has 
already supported the development of the Arctic shipping lanes, whose gradual emergence for 
wider-scale utilization makes it possible to manage energy transportation-related risks (e.g. 
Beveridge et al., 2016). More specifically, the Sino-Arctic economic activities that already stand to 
shape the dynamics of the Arctic region on a more frequent basis include sailings on the Northeast 
Passage (NEP) and liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects in the Russian Arctic. The NEP, which is 
the most prospective of the three Arctic sea routes known to the Chinese as the Polar Silk Road1, 
runs through waters north of Russia and offers Chinese stakeholders a shorter route to the 
European markets and helps the government to alleviate its “Malacca dilemma”. LNG is the least 
environmentally harmful fossil fuel that offers a chance to diversify China’s energy portfolio and 
reduce its dependence on coal, which accounts for 58 percent of China’s energy consumption (BP, 
2019). What is more, the two Arctic LNG projects in which China takes part, the Yamal LNG 
Project and the Arctic LNG 2, are not only schemes that add on to the Russia-China flows of LNG 
but also scenes on which state-of-the-art technology and knowledge are needed, providing a fruitful 
chance for Chinese companies to gain insights from leading global actors, especially on engineering, 
energy production and transportation in challenging Arctic conditions (Kauppila, 2022). 
In addition, Chinese actors have expressed their strong intent to gain a foothold in the extraction 
of Arctic minerals and rare earth elements as well as in Arctic fisheries. Minerals and rare earth 
elements have several uses in both energy (e.g. nuclear electricity generation) and technology (e.g. 
clean tech) sectors in China, whereas the fishing industry contributes significantly to China’s GDP 
and constitutes an important element of Chinese traditions. The polar science projects, in turn, 
offer a fruitful chance to develop China’s science sector in a highly international environment.  
Mitigation of the effects of climate change on China 
Wellbeing in China is also threatened by climate change, whose effects culminate in the Arctic. 
According to recent studies, the Arctic climatic changes are linked to extreme weather events, 
winter cold weather in East Asia (Kim & Kim, 2018), air pollution and flooding in Eastern China 
(Wang, Chen & Liu, 2015), and problems in China’s agricultural production. All the above-
mentioned issues are potential sources of general citizen dissatisfaction and triggers for protests 
and social unrest. For these reasons, the government funds scientific research on Arctic climate 
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change, which is, for example, conducted together with the Russians on polar expeditions and 
under the auspices of a joint research institute, and partakes in Arctic governance – and this way 
contributes to those social and political processes that reconstruct the Arctic region.   
Promoting a unifying ideology 
In addition to the two above-mentioned material acts, bringing the people together through 
spiritual means is an effective way to enhance social stability. A unifying ideology can instil a sense 
of belonging and mental affinity towards a collective in a multiethnic and multicultural country. In 
recent decades, however, finding such a shared system of ideals has become a challenge for the 
leadership because economic and political reforms have eroded the role of socialism as the 
guideline of the Chinese society. As a response to this “spiritual and ideological vacuum” (Kallio, 
2016: 52), state-nationalism (爱国主义) has emerged as an officially accepted, pragmatic belief system 
that instills a sense of collective pride by emphasizing the glorious performance of the party in 
China’s return to the great power status – instead of hailing shared attributes that not all Chinese 
can relate to (Zhao, 2004). 
In President Xi’s national rejuvenation (民族复兴), national prowess in such fields as science and 
technology have emerged as a core theme of the nationalist story. Over the past two decades, the 
Arctic science collaboration, expeditions and ambitious economic projects have served to fuel 
nationalist sentiments by constructing an image of a “polar great power”, a militarily, economically 
and scientifically capable modern country whose influence extends over both poles (Brady, 2017). 
For example, the National Museum of China portrays pictures of the ice-breaker Xuelong and the 
Arctic Yellow River Station magnificently in line with the country’s space program; in a similar vein, 
the museum at the Polar Research Institute of China emphasizes China’s task to become a “great 
polar expedition country” (“成为极地考察大国”). Although China’s Arctic science engagement is 
definitely not only motivated by these nationalist aspirations, it is important to recognize them in 
analyzing China’s role in processes of Arctic regionalization. 
China’s enlightened self-interest and the (re)organization of the Arctic 
region 
Apparently, the contemporary liberal international order may constrain the Chinese government’s 
efforts to maintain social stability at domestic level. Therefore, not only China’s capability but also 
its motivation to reform the building blocks of international order may increase in line with its rise 
to great power status. To be a responsible international citizen, however, China has to refrain from 
posing a threat or using force in rewriting international rules and norms so that they correspond 
with its own values and interests. As Evans (1990) underlines, responsible international citizens 
pursue “enlightened self-interest” (italics added by the authors), meaning that China should exercise 
its growing power prudently by reconciling its policies and actions with the established international 
rules to maintain international peace and order. In this section, we ponder the extent to which 
China has, so far, conformed to and sought to mold international practices that organize the Arctic 
region in acting out its responsibility to provide wellbeing to its citizens. While acknowledging 
unique characteristics of the Arctic, we do not subscribe to the idea about the Arctic as an 
exceptional region. Hence, we build on a premise that the Arctic is organised by the same set of 
practices – territoriality and sovereignty, diplomacy, harm prevention and environmental 
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stewardship, international law, and nationalism (e.g. Buzan, 2004) – as the contemporary 
international society at large, and study China’s contribution to those practices.  
Territoriality and sovereignty 
To a large extent, the minimum requirement for China to participate in processes of Arctic 
regionalization would be that it accepts two norms constitutive of Arctic regional society: 
sovereignty and territoriality. Although these two international practices substantially hinder 
China’s attempts to utilize Arctic natural resources for creating growth and greenifying the Chinese 
economy, it cannot take actions that violate them for two reasons. First, as a non-Arctic country, 
China is dependent on partnerships in utilizing the region’s resources. For example, around 84 
percent of Arctic fossil fuel deposits are located offshore north of Siberia, Alaska, Canada and 
Greenland (U.S. Geological Survey, 2008), in locations belonging to the Arctic states or their 
exclusive economic zones (EEZ), that is, sea areas over which they have jurisdiction according to 
the UNCLOS. Second, China can only benefit from Arctic resources if the region is a conflict-free 
and stable scene of coexistence. 
Insofar as direct violations of territorial integrity or making of sovereignty claims count as ultimate 
infringements of these norms, China has certainly refrained from breaching territoriality and 
sovereignty in the Arctic. It has not used force against the political independence of the Arctic 
states or made any sovereignty claims over the Arctic land and waters. Although four Chinese navy 
vessels reportedly entered the US EEZ near Alaska’s Aleutian islands in late August 2021, they did 
remain in international waters and cannot be seen to have violated the US sovereignty (e.g. 
Schreiber, 2021). Moreover, China has relied on cooperation and established partnerships that 
allow Chinese companies to participate in Arctic energy and mineral extraction. For example, the 
government’s investment vehicle Silk Road Fund became directly engaged in a pioneering Arctic 
LNG project in Russia’s Yamal Peninsula in 2016. Through this move, the government supported 
a Russo-French-Chinese joint venture in which the state-owned China National Petroleum 
Corporation is a 20 percent shareholder (Yamal LNG Project, n.d.). Chinese participation in the 
mega project has not only provided the country’s economy with notable volumes of LNG since 
July 2018, when the first shipment to China took place (Novatek, 2018), but also given Chinese 
companies a chance to develop skills needed in future projects in the region, including possible oil 
drilling schemes. A similar project with equal benefits to the Chinese economy is currently launched 
in Gydan Peninsula, as Novatek’s second LNG project, Arctic LNG 2, is gradually starting its 
operations.  
Yet, at the same time, China does somewhat seek to shape the organization of regional order by 
challenging the norms of territoriality and sovereignty through more subtle methods. Notably, China 
promotes an idea of the Arctic region that somewhat downplays territoriality as its constitutive 
practice. As China’s Arctic strategy puts it, “The Arctic situation now goes beyond its original inter-
Arctic States or regional nature, having a vital bearing on the interests of States outside the region 
and the interests of the international community as a whole, as well as on the survival, the 
development, and the shared future for mankind” (State Council of the PRC, 2018b). In a similar 
vein, China has adopted a self-identification as a “near-Arctic state” (近北极国家). Unsurprisingly, 
this discourse has been interpreted as a hawkish claim in more realist (mostly American) analyses 
– despite the fact that many other non-Arctic states, such as France and India, view and portray 
their position in a similar manner (cf. Heininen et al., 2019). 
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To support the non-territorial definition of the Arctic region, China also highlights the global 
nature of the region’s governance structure – a viewpoint that somewhat downplays the role of the 
AC. For example, it has emphasized the importance of international law as an instrument of 
responsible Arctic governance in major Arctic-related statements over the past few years. The 
government has repeatedly emphasized the stipulations of the UNCLOS, which outline that 
external actors possess certain rights to conduct research, navigate and explore resources in the 
world’s oceans (State Council of the PRC, 2018b). Chinese scholars have also sought to frame 
some of the natural resources of the Arctic as global commons (e.g. Yan & Li, 2009; Yang et al., 
2015). Moreover, some Chinese researchers have expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
exclusiveness of the existing Arctic governance structure by stating that it does not allow non-
Arctic countries to take part in its decision-making, even when it deals with “global issues” (Guo 
& Yao, 2015). Despite the lively debate in Chinese academia, the government, however, refrains 
from outright criticism of the Arctic Council in official contexts. In this way, it avoids spurring 
speculation as to whether the country is truly committed to acting out its pledge not to intervene 
in the Arctic countries’ internal issues, that is, to respect the organizing principle of sovereignty. 
International law 
International law directly enables China to participate in those processes of Arctic regionalization 
that allow the country to create economic growth and conduct science activities to mitigate climate 
change related risks in China. The UNCLOS, in particular, not only guarantees China the right to 
ship in the Arctic waters but also provides the right to practice scientific research in certain parts 
of the Arctic. In a similar vein, the Treaty of Svalbard, which China signed in 1925, has enabled 
China to set its own research station, Yellow River Research Station (黄河站) in Norway’s Svalbard. 
Recently, China has also contributed to the development of new regulations concerning the Arctic. 
In 2015, China was invited by the Arctic Ocean coastal states, together with other major fishing 
nations (Japan, South Korea, and Iceland) and the EU to take part in negotiations on a legally 
binding agreement on preventing unregulated fishing in the high seas portion of the Central Arctic 
Ocean until sustainability of such activities can be guaranteed. As a result, the 2018 Agreement to 
Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean was adopted. After China 
ratified the agreement in May 2021, it entered into force. In addition, China took part in the 
formulation of the IMO’s Polar Code, a standard that sets tightened regulations for shipping in the 
Arctic (and Antarctic) waters.  
Although it has become common to almost “expect” China to behave in a manner that violates 
the stipulations of the UNCLOS based on the quarrels in the South China Sea (cf. Lanteigne, 2021), 
China has, so far, largely internalized the norms of international law in the Arctic context. As 
mentioned above, Chinese navy vessels did not break international law in late August 2021 as they 
did not enter the US territorial waters. Only on one occasion has China – possibly – interpreted 
international law in a manner that has been questioned by the Arctic states. In 2017, Xuelong sailed 
through the Northwest Passage under a research permit issued by the Canadian authorities, but 
based on the stipulations of the UNCLOS. According to the Chinese state media, the test sailing 
was also utilized for gaining insights for commercial sailings (cf. Fife & Chase, 2017) – something 
that the research permit does not allow one to do. However, there is no concrete evidence of such 
actions being taken; in fact, it may well be that Xinhua’s interpretation of the expedition was rather 
a nationalist show targeted at the domestic audience than a report of its true nature. 
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Diplomacy 
Adhering to the norms of diplomacy has been crucial for China to be able to participate in Arctic 
regionalization and thus advance its enlightened self-interests. While China’s Arctic strategy does 
not pay much attention to the role of the AC in regional governance, it confirms that “China is 
committed to improving and complementing the Arctic governance regime” (State Council of the 
PRC, 2018b). Currently, bilateral interaction between China and the Arctic countries constitutes 
one of the most concrete domains of the country’s Arctic diplomacy. China has, for example, 
strengthened its “bilateral” relations with the Nordic countries under the model of 5+1 diplomacy, 
on issues ranging from science and technology to transport and energy extraction (cf. Sverdrup-
Thygeson et al., 2018). Diplomacy has also facilitated the above-mentioned energy projects in 
Russia and advanced Chinese economic visions in the Arctic more generally: without strong 
diplomatic ties, managed by the highest leadership, Sino-Russian business collaboration in 
developing energy resources and shipping lanes would not be possible. In addition to allocating 
funding to the actual projects, the governments and leaders of the two countries have eased 
informal barriers to investments, participated in the negotiations of both new and older deals, made 
field visits, signed Memorandums of Understanding etc. in the spirit of state capitalism. Notably, 
the Western economic sanctions, imposed on Russia in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis in 
2014 strengthened the Sino-Russian Arctic partnership: they created a diplomatic and economic 
vacuum which China could fill (cf. Gabuev, 2016). 
The practice of diplomacy is, however, sometimes at odds with China’s urge to access Arctic 
resources. In 2010, China froze its diplomatic ties with Norway as a response to the decision to 
award the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. Economic sanctions with Chinese 
characteristics soon followed: new veterinary inspections were introduced to control the 
Norwegian exporters’ access to the Chinese market. As a recent gravity model study evaluates, 
during the period of 2011-2016 this resulted in a 92% drop in the value of Chinese imports of fresh 
and chilled salmon from Norway – as compared with a non-sanction environment that would have 
given the Norwegians a chance to expand their business in China (Blomfeldt Mathisrud, 2018). It 
is, however, unsurprising that the Chinese desire for presumably safe and clean Arctic salmon was 
soon satisfied with imports from other Northern areas (e.g. Faroe Islands) – some of which traded 
salmon of Norwegian-origin (Chen & Garcia, 2016). Another related example is the case of 
Sweden: the Swedish reaction to the captivity of Gui Minhai, a Swedish dissident of Chinese origin, 
has resulted in diplomatic tensions that have, for example, indirectly led to China setting official 
warnings against travelling to Sweden and imposing sanctions on a Swedish researcher. Although 
numerical estimations on the actual economic impact of these diplomatic frictions are not yet 
available, it is fair to say that Sweden has, overall, become less of a potential destination for Polar 
Silk Road related investments. These cases illustrate that although overseas resources contribute to 
growth and wellbeing, most Arctic opportunities are not vitally important for Chinese economic 
development and business certainly does not continue “as usual” if the social conditions for wellbeing 
are at risk. Put differently, glorifying the work of dissidents poses a more pressing risk to social 
stability than freezing or cooling diplomatic relations with small Arctic countries. 
China has also adhered to the norm of diplomacy in seeking to mitigate the domestic risks of 
climate change as a member of the Arctic regional society. It has sought to utilize both formal and 
informal forums of Arctic governance to advance its own agendas and voice its concerns. Despite 
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the rather restricted scope of action of the Arctic Council observers, and the fact that China is not 
committed to the Council’s work to reduce black carbon emissions, it is important for China to be 
able to participate in the climate discussions that are held under its auspices. Interestingly, the 
Chinese government also partakes in another, yet emerging setting focusing on mitigating the 
effects of Arctic climatic changes. Three East Asian observer members of the Arctic Council 
(China, Japan and South Korea) have organized trilateral meetings on Arctic collaboration since 
April 2016 – a rare move in the historically tricky context of East Asia. Through this arrangement 
China seeks to make its voice better heard in the growing mass of Arctic Council observer states 
and enhance research collaboration among its neighbors (Second Trilateral High-Level Dialogue 
on the Arctic, 2017). In a similar vein, China has become an active participant in large annual 
meetings located between track II and track I diplomacy. Particularly, the Arctic Circle Assembly 
has become an important forum for China to influence the Arctic community. In May 2019, China 
organized the first-ever Arctic Circle China Forum in Shanghai, giving an opportunity for the 
Chinese officials to build trust among the Arctic community – a key purpose of the practice of 
diplomacy. 
Harm prevention and environmental stewardship 
Despite the wide-spread criticism that China has faced with regard to its environmental practices 
globally, China has refrained from violating the key norms of harm prevention and environmental 
stewardship in the Arctic. From China’s perspective, adhering to these norms has both allowed 
China to mitigate the effects of climate change on China and build trust within and outside the AC, 
which is needed to advance its economic visions in the future. Yet, this is not to say that China 
would have, in any way, sought to advance their more ambitious implementation – although taking 
such an initiative could greatly strengthen its status as a legitimate member of the region and truly 
allow it to take a driver’s seat in processes of Arctic regionalization.  
As mentioned above, China has been favorable towards two legal standards that seek to prevent 
harm and protect the environment in the region. As for the Polar Code, China participated in the 
initial correspondence group and gave its own proposals calling for less strict stipulations 
(Eiterjord, 2020), but in the end did not oppose the final draft. Although the fisheries agreement 
hinders the Chinese fishing industry from gaining access to the Arctic high sea fisheries, being part 
of the agreement can be seen as an investment in the future: aligning with the Arctic states builds 
trust, which is needed for more important schemes, such as energy deals. 
It should, however, be noted that Arctic climatic changes largely result from global greenhouse gas 
emissions. Therefore, if China, the largest carbon dioxide emitter in the world, is truly to tackle the 
domestic risks created by Arctic climatic changes, the first and foremost way of doing so would be 
to mitigate its own emissions. In September 2020, China indeed announced an ambitious goal of 
reaching carbon neutrality by 2060 (Xi, 2020). Although China has neither managed to halt the 
growth of its emissions nor taken part in the Arctic Council’s work to reduce black carbon 
emissions, recent developments regarding China’s overseas investments have been promising. In 
July 2021, Guidelines for Greening Overseas Investment and Cooperation were issued by the 
Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, and in September 2021, at 
the UN General Assembly, President Xi announced that China would no longer invest in building 
coal power abroad. At the same time, especially the lack of concrete environmental engagement in 
the work of the Arctic Council stands as a clear contradiction of the fact that China’s pursuit of 
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wealth through Arctic fossil fuels itself is a significant source of pollutants causing Arctic 
environmental change. 
Nationalism 
The organizing practice of nationalism carries a great potential to both hinder and advance China’s 
participation in those processes of Arctic regionalization that allow China to promote wellbeing 
through Arctic resources. 
Particularly, the highly controversial case of Greenland illustrates both the constraints and potential 
of nationalism from China’s perspective. Some Greenlandic politicians have welcomed Chinese 
investments in rare earth and uranium resources because it gives the autonomous country 
economic freedom from Denmark. For the Danish government, however, Chinese involvement 
poses risks, not least because Greenland’s new economic development opens the door for the 
island’s independence (e.g. Gad et al., 2018). Furthermore, Greenland’s northwest coast hosts a US 
Air Force military base, Thule Air Base, which makes Sino-Greenlandic collaboration a matter of 
concern for the US. These reasons have already affected China’s ability to do business in 
Greenland.  
The establishment of China’s science and satellite stations in the Arctic has also fueled “China 
threat theories” (cf. Broomfield, 2003) and nationalist sentiments in Arctic countries. Currently, 
China has these outposts in three Arctic countries: Norway’s Svalbard, Iceland and Sweden. In 
addition, it has expressed interest in establishing an establishment in Greenland (Cui, 2017) – 
though so far without success. Several key reports, including those produced by the US and Danish 
governments (e.g. Office of the Secretary of Defence, 2019; Reuters, 2019), have recently noted 
that these stations could be used for military purposes, i.e. collecting satellite data for the armed 
forces and monitoring more than just northern lights and indicators related to climate change. 
These sentiments may possibly become a major hindrance in China’s urge to utilize Arctic 
resources to promote wellbeing in China – even if no actual dual-use would be detected.  
Conclusions 
This paper took a departure from the mainstream approaches to IR, which presume that states’ 
regional conduct is par excellence motivated by struggles for power. We sought to demonstrate 
that China’s participation in Arctic regionalization is guided by its notions of responsibility. By 
investigating the normative underpinnings of China’s Arctic policy, we also hope to increase 
intercultural understanding, which is necessary to secure a resilient future – both in the Arctic and 
globally. 
Our purpose was not to assess China’s regional engagement in moral terms. If one wants to 
evaluate whether or not China’s notions of responsibility are ethically acceptable, it is useful to look 
at whether China is doing something that could be viewed as irresponsible. In other words, we may 
gain a better understanding of Chinese practices, perceptions and objectives by highlighting what 
China does not do in the Arctic. Our analysis demonstrates, for example,  that China has not 
violated the sovereignty of Arctic states or questioned their economic rights. In addition, it has not 
sought to establish an alternative regional governance model to the AC, although it has, in general, 
taken a more global approach to regional affairs. Conversely, peaceful socio-economic 
development of the Arctic is a precondition for China’s goals to promote wellbeing of its citizens. 
Yet, the purpose of this paper was not to compile a list on what China, or any other state, should 
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do to be recognized as a responsible international citizen. This would be a difficult task to do: at 
the age of increased uncertainty and manufactured risks – or a risk society, as Ulrich Beck puts it 
– it is increasingly difficult to define what it means to be a responsible international citizen. What 
is clear, however, is that responsibilities and risks go hand in hand: responsible international citizens 
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